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ABSTRACT
When a person seeks to be relieved from their contractual obligations on the
basis of supervening knowledge of a fact existing at the time of contracting that has
rendered their performance impracticable or even impossible, and/or has frustrated
their purpose in entering into the contract, they would appear to have choice
between asserting a mutual mistake enforcibility defense or instead asserting one or
more of the impossibility, impracticability, or frustration of purpose excuse
defenses. Do they in fact have this choice, or does each of these approaches for
obtaining judicial relief have its own distinct scope of application, with little if any
overlap? If there are circumstances where a person does have this choice, which
approach is likely to be more promising as the primary means of seeking relief?
There is unfortunately a relative absence of clarifying case law on this
question, and this brief article considers the guidance provided by Sections 152 and
266 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the associated Official
Comments. The article concludes that where there is a choice available between
the two approaches the question as to which one to most aggressively pursue,
rather than only plead secondarily in the alternative, turns upon the definition of
“materiality” that will be applied by the court with regard to the mutual mistake
defense. The mutual mistake defense approach is likely to be the more promising
tact in all instances, although perhaps only marginally so if the court applies the
most stringent materiality criterion somewhat ambivalently suggested by the
Official Comment to Restatement (Second) Section 152.
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INTRODUCTION
Assume that two persons have entered into a contract with one another.
Assume also that at the time of contracting they each reasonably believed that a
certain possible event had not occurred. That event had already taken place,
however, and the contracting parties then later learned of this, a situation
commonly referred to as their obtaining “supervening knowledge” of a fact
existing at the time of contracting. Assume now that one party to the contract then
seeks judicial relief from their contractual obligations because their performance
has been made significantly more burdensome by the event – perhaps enough more
so to be made impracticable or even impossible – or because their principal
purpose in entering into the contract has been substantially frustrated by the event,
or both.2
Given supervening knowledge of an existing fact that has these adverse
consequences for a person’s performance obligations and/or for the ability of the
contract to satisfy their purposes there appear to be two plausible arguments that
this person could offer in an attempt to obtain judicial relief from their obligations.

2. That person could be a defendant in a breach of contract action, or the plaintiff in an
action seeking either rescission or reformation of the contract. I will hereafter refer to the person
asserting a mutual mistake defense or an excuse defense in an attempt to reduce or eliminate their
contractual obligations as the “party seeking relief.”
3

One argument would be that the circumstances meet the criteria for judicial relief
on the basis of a mutual mistake as to a fact existing at the time of contracting.3
The other argument would be that the circumstances meet the criteria for relief
from contractual obligations because a fact that was unknown to both of the parties
at the time of contracting gives rise to either an impracticability or impossibility or
frustration of purpose excuse defense.4
Both the mutual mistake and excuse defense theories appear on their face to
fit this simple hypothetical situation equally well; they clearly have at least a
“substantial area of overlap.”5 Where both approaches appear to be potentially
viable one would think that the mutual mistake theory would in general be the
better approach to pursue, given that it would appear to be much easier to
3. “Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic
assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of
performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of
mistake under the rule stated in Section 154.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section
152(1).
4. “Where, at the time a contract is made, a party’s performance under it is impracticable
without his fault because of a fact of which he has no reason to know and the non-existence of
which is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty to render that performance
arises, unless the language or circumstances indicate the contrary...Where, at the time a contract
is made, a party’s principle purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by a fact of which
he has no reason to know and the non-existence of which is a basic assumption on which the
contract is made, no duty of that party to render that performance arises, unless the language or
circumstances indicate the contrary.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 266(1), (2).
5 “In broad outline the doctrines of impracticability and frustration of purpose resemble
the doctrine of mistake…there is a substantial area of overlap between the three doctrines.
Alumimum Co. of American v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F.Supp. 53, 70-72 (1980) (hereinafter
“ALCOA”).
4

demonstrate the “materiality” of the mistake, as that defense requires, than it would
be to meet the very demanding eligibility criteria for any of the several excuse
defenses that I will later discuss.6 But is it really that simple? Do the two
approaches overlap whenever supervening knowledge of an existing fact has the
significant consequences noted above, thus always favoring assertion of the mutual
mistake defense? Or do these approaches instead each have largely separate and
distinct areas of application, with only limited overlap, with the appropriate tact to
take in seeking relief depending on the presence or absence of certain other
factors? And in those instances where there is overlap, at least in the limited sense
that the several common threshold requirements of each of the two approaches are
met, what other factors might suggest that a particular approach would be the most
promising?
I have been teaching introductory contract law at the Dedman School of Law
at Southern Methodist University for almost 30 years. Over that time I have
always called to my students’ attention the fact that under the circumstances of
6 “A second distinction between the [mutual mistake and impracticability] doctrines,
however, makes mistake appear the more attractive argument. A party who claims relief for
mistake must show that the mistake had a material effect on his performance…To obtain relief
for impracticability, on the other hand, the party must show that the event had made performance
impossible or nearly so…Thus a party arguing mutual mistake has the advantage in that he need
not show that performance has become impracticable, but need only show that the balance of the
exchange was materially affected.” E Allan Farnsworth, Julia L. Brickell & Stephen P,.
Chawaga, “Relief for Mutual Mistake and Impracticability,” 1 J. L. & Comm. 1, 27 (1981).
5

supervening knowledge of an existing fact that has the impact described above we
have the unusual situation of two different mitigating doctrines, based on different
underlying rationales, that each appear to apply as a basis for the party prejudiced
by the fact obtaining relief. This point unfortunately comes up towards the end of
the spring semester when I am scrambling to try to complete the two-semester
contracts course sequence coverage, and my time is unusually tight. As a result I
have always rather superficially and cavalierly told my students that if they need to
later address this question on behalf of their clients they should “check the
probably rather sparse collection of mutual mistake and excuse defense precedents
that exist in the relevant jurisdiction” to see which theory would appear to be more
promising as a means of obtaining relief, given the specific facts of their case, and
that in most instances the mutual mistake approach is likely to be the more
promising tact because of its less demanding requirements, and I leave it at that. I
have now decided that it is time for me to give this question a little more thought so
that I can provide students with a more complete and accurate discussion of the
choices that lawyers will face under these circumstances the next time that I cover
this material in class.
In this brief essay I will first consider whether there is any basis in the law
for guiding a person’s choice between assertion of the mutual mistake defense or
6

assertion of the relevant excuse defense, under those supervening knowledge
circumstances that potentially satisfy the elements of either defense, in an attempt
to obtain judicial relief from their contractual obligations.7 I will then consider
whether those legal principles that now guide this choice are justified.

MUTUAL MISTAKE V. THE EXCUSE DEFENSES
The ideal source of authority for choosing between the mutual mistake and
the excuse defense approaches as a means for obtaining relief under supervening
knowledge circumstances would be the judicial opinions handed down in those
cases where a person has asserted both a mutual mistake defense and an excuse
defense as alternative bases for relief under those circumstances, and where both
approaches satisfy the several threshold criteria they share that I will later discuss,
and where the court has then granted relief under one theory but denied it under the
other theory. Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate any such cases. There
is one relatively well-known 1980 case that I will refer to extensively in this article
in which a federal district court discussed at length the mutual mistake approach
7 There is, of course, no reason why a person seeking relief could not plead both of these
theories as alternative bases for relief, and this is often done. As a matter of argumentative
strategy, however, it is usually more effective to first argue the more plausible theory that
advances one’s case before turning to less persuasive alternative theories, if those other theories
are convincing enough to even merit being argued at all, and to do this one must first assess
which approach is more likely to prove successful.
7

and both the impracticability and frustration of purpose excuse defense approaches,
and then granted relief under each of these several theories,8 and there are likely to
exist at least a few other such cases as well.9 In addition, there are many opinions
in which courts have denied both mutual mistake and excuse defense arguments for
relief. But I have not located any cases which allow relief under one approach but
reject the other approach when they have both been advanced as alternative
theories, and that would thus suggest fact-specific grounds for choosing between
the two approaches. The paucity if not complete absence of such cases suggests
that any meaningful distinctions that can be drawn between these two approaches
as to their relative merits and proper scope of application will be rather subtle. In
the absence of clear case law let me now turn to the guidance provided by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
8. ALCOA, supra n. 5. In that case the federal district court extensively discussed the
mutual mistake argument, as well as the impracticability and frustration of purpose arguments,
that ALCOA had made seeking equitable modification of the terms of its contract with Essex
Group, Inc., id. at 53-78. The court there ruled that under Indiana law, id. at 59, each of these
three theories provided a sufficient independent basis for granting ALCOA the relief sought, id.
at 70-72. The opinion provides a comprehensive and useful discussion of the several elements of
each of these theories, id. at 60-78, but since the court upheld all three of these theories
(apparently in anticipation of being subjected to close appellate review, id. at 70) the case
unfortunately does not shed much light on the appropriate contours of the various approaches, on
when one approach is likely to prove more promising than the others. As I will later discuss,
however, the ALCOA opinion does discuss the “material effect” criterion of the mutual mistake
defense, id. at 64-65, a topic that has some relevance for choosing between the two approaches.
9 See., e.g., Murray v. Willistown Twp., 169 A.3d 84, 92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017)
(upholding a mutual mistake claim on appeal while noting that “the issue here more closely
resembles one of impracticability of performance.”)
8

A. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts Framework
If one compares the Restatement (Second) of Contracts treatment of the
mutual mistake defense with its treatment of the several excuse defenses under
supervening knowledge circumstances one can see that the drafters of that
document had in mind that these two approaches should have somewhat different
primary areas of application, but with some overlap as well. The position taken
appears to be that under most (but not all) circumstances either one or the other of
these two approaches would be better suited to the addressing the equities of the
situation than would be the other approach. These distinctions, however, are
somewhat buried in ambiguous discussions contained in the Official Comments
rather than featured more visibly and clearly in the text of the relevant Sections,
and consequently they have received less scholarly and judicial attention then they
perhaps merit.
Let me start by setting out for comparison the text of Restatement (Second)
Section 152(1) that articulates the common law mutual mistake defense with the
text of Section 266(1) and (2) that sets forth the scope of the common law
impracticability defense (and implicitly also the impossibility defense) and the
frustration of purpose defense under supervening knowledge circumstances:
9

B. Analysis of the Text of Sections 152(1) and 266(1) and (2)
“Section 152. When Mistake of Both Parties Makes a Contract
Voidable
(1) Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic
assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed
exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party
unless he bears the risk of mistake under the rule stated in Section 154.”10

“Section 266. Existing Impracticability or Frustration
(1) Where, at the time a contract is made, a party’s performance under it is
impracticable without his fault because of a fact of which he has no reason to know
and the non-existence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is
made, no duty to render that performance arises, unless the language or
circumstances indicate the contrary.
(2) Where, at the time a contract is made, a party’s principle purpose is
substantially frustrated without his fault by a fact of which he has no reason to
know and the non-existence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract
10. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 152(1).
10

is made, no duty of that party to render that performance arises, unless the
language or circumstances indicate the contrary.”11

Both the mutual mistake and the excuse defense approach require the person
seeking relief under supervening knowledge circumstances to satisfy the same
three threshold elements. First of all, they each require that the non-existence of
the relevant facts at the time of contracting was a basic assumption shared by both
parties to the contract. Second, they each require that the party seeking relief is not
at fault for not knowing that the relevant facts already existed at the time of
contracting. Third, they each require that neither the contract language nor the
surrounding circumstances indicate that the party seeking relief has assumed the
risk of the relevant facts being in existence at the time of contracting.12 Failure to
meet all three of these threshold requirements will bar a person from obtaining
relief under either approach. So, assuming that all of three of these threshold
elements are met under supervening knowledge circumstances, based on the text of

11. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 266(1), (2).
12 Allan Farnsworth in his prominent contract law treatise takes the position that with
regard to these two approaches “[I]t is more likely that a party will be regarded as having borne
the risk of mistake rather than the risk of supervening frustration.” E. Allan Farnsworth,
Contracts (4th ed. 2004), at 607. See also Farnsworth et al, supra n. 6, at 27 “[C]ourts are more
likely to find that a party bore the risk of the disadvantage caused by a mutual mistake than that a
party assumed the risk that performance would become impracticable.”)
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these two Restatement (Second) Sections which of these two approaches is more
likely to succeed as a basis for obtaining relief?
The key concept for sorting this out is the principle of materiality. Once the
threshold criteria noted above have been met the remaining criterion for the mutual
mistake defense under Section 152(1) is that the mistake have a “material effect on
the agreed exchange.”13 Each of the several excuse defenses also has its own
required hardship criterion, in lieu of a materiality criterion, in addition to those
three threshold criteria set forth above. Under Section 266(1) the remaining
criterion is that the party’s performance be rendered “impracticable,”14 and under
Section 266(2) the remaining criterion is that the party’s “principle purpose is
substantially frustrated.”15 There is an extensive body of case law regarding what
must be demonstrated to satisfy each of these various criteria for being excused
that I will not address in this brief essay, other than to here note that the several
excuse defenses all have very demanding requirements.16 The question I will focus

13 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 152(1).
14 While Section 266 does not have a provision relating to supervening impossibility,
presumably that situation is covered under Section 266(1) as an extreme form of impracticability
where the increase in cost resulting from the relevant events is essentially infinite.
15 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 266(2).
16 For discussion of the various criteria of the excuse defenses see, e.g., ALCOA, supra
n. 5, at 70-78. See also UCC S. 2-615 and the Official Comment to that section; Nicholas R.
Weiskopf, “Frustration of Contractual Purpose – Doctrine or Myth?,” 70 St. Johns L. Rev. 239
(2012); Melvin A. Eisenberg, “Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration,” 1 J. Leg. Anal.
12

upon here is this: under these supervening knowledge circumstances when one or
more of these excuse defenses is potentially available as an avenue for relief, is the
mutual mistake approach also available as an alternative approach and, if so, under
what circumstances would the mutual mistake approach be the more promising
approach to pursue?
“Materiality” is a rather protean legal concept one that takes different shapes
in different contractual contexts. The usual understanding of the phrase “material
change” under general commercial law17 or under securities law18 is that it refers to
any change that is more than di minimus in impact, a very low threshold. On the
other hand, the assessment as to whether a person’s failure to fully perform a
contractual obligation rises to the level of a “material breach” for the purpose of
determining whether there has been non-fulfillment of an implied-in-law condition
of the other party’s performance obligations involves a complex, multi-factor
analysis where in some instances even a significantly deficient performance may

207 (2009); Farnsworth et al (1981), supra n. 6.
17. Consider, for example, UCC Section 2-207, the “battle of the forms” provision.
Under Section 2-207(2)(b) an additional term in an expression of acceptance will not become
part of the contract if it “materially” alters the contract, and Official Comments 4. and 5. to that
Section make clear that the drafters here intended to impose a very low di minimus materiality
theshold.
18. See., e.g., TSC Industries v. Northway, 426 US 438, 444-449 (1976) (defining a
“material” fact as one for which there need by only a substantial likelihood that it would have
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of a reasonable shareholder).
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be regarded as a “non-material breach.”19 The impracticability excuse defense, in
contrast, usually requires far more than simply “material” increases in the cost of
performance, as well as requiring also a significant change in the nature of the
required performance.20 The impossibility excuse defense is of course even more
demanding as to the necessary impact of the relevant events upon performance.
And the benefits that a party expects to obtain from a contract have to be not just
“materially” reduced but instead drastically impaired if not eliminated altogether
by an event for its impact to be regarded as sufficient to ”substantially frustrate” a
person’s “principle purpose.”21
The conclusion therefore suggested by comparing the texts of Sections
152(1) and 266(1) and (2) is that the mutual mistake approach should probably be
the preferred approach for seeking relief, even if an excuse defense may also be
potentially available, because due to the less stringent “materiality” requirement
the mutual mistake approach will dominate each of the excuse defenses with their
more restrictive criteria under all circumstances in which both approaches meet the
19. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 241, which assesses whether a
party’s failure to fully perform a contract obligation is “material” by a complex multi-factor
analysis where the extent to which the deficient performance impairs the benefits obtained by the
other party is only one factor to be considered.
20 See, e.g., Transatlantic Financing Corporation v., United States, 363 F.2d 312, ___
(D.C. Cir. 1966); see also UCC S. 2-615, Comment 4; Eisenberg, supra n. 16.
21. See generally Nicholas R. Weiskopf, “Frustration of Contractual Purpose – Doctrine
or Myth?,” 70 St. Johns L. Rev. 239 (1996).
14

other threshold criteria.22 In other words, the mutual mistake approach will allow
for a party to obtain relief in all supervening knowledge situations where relief
could also be obtained on the basis of impracticability (or impossibility) under
Section 266(1), or where relief would be available for frustration of purpose under
Section 266(2), as well as providing relief under some circumstances where none
of those excuse defenses would succeed.

C. The Official Comments to Sections 152 and 266
This conclusion that is based solely upon a textual comparison of the two
relevant Restatement (Second) Sections is undercut to some extent, however, by
the Official Comments to these Sections, for a couple of reasons. First of all,
Comment c. to Section 152 takes the position that for there to be a “material effect
upon the exchange” for mutual mistake purposes that (except for “exceptional
cases”23) the mistake must have an impact on both of the parties to the contract, not

22 “[M]utual mistake…does not require the same level of loss [as does the
impracticability excuse] to permit avoidance of the contract, i.e., mutual mistake only requires a
material effect upon performance.” John Edward Murry, Jr., Murray on Contracts (5th ed. 2011)
at 719 n. 74.
23 “In such [ordinary] cases the materiality of the effect on the agreed exchange will be
determined by the overall impact on both parties. In exceptional cases the adversely affected
party may be able to show that the effect on the agreed exchange has been material simply on the
ground that the exchange has become less desirable for him, even though there has been no effect
on the other party. Cases of hardship that result in no advantage to the other party, are, however,
15

merely an impact only upon the person seeking relief as to the cost or nature or
possibility of their performance even if that impact is very substantial, or as to the
ability of the contract to meet that person’s primary purposes, again without regard
to the significance of this impact.24
The drafters of Section 152(1) apparently envisioned as the paradigm cases
for defining the scope of the mutual mistake defense the two classic 19th century
Sherwood v. Walker25 and Wood v. Boynton26 mutual mistake cases, where one of
these cases allowed the defense27 and the other did not.28 In each of those cases the
mutual mistake made as to the value of the goods at issue in setting the contract
price impacted both the buyers and sellers of the goods, benefitting the buyers but
injuring the sellers by an equal amount. But the mistakes made in these cases did
not give rise to excuse defenses by the adversely impacted sellers because their
performances of delivering the goods at issue were not rendered impossible nor
ordinarily appropriately left to the rules on impracticability and frustration. See Illustration 9 and
Section 266.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 152, Comment c (italics added for
emphasis). The Comment unfortunately does not clarify what would constitute an “exceptional”
case where the mutual mistake defense could be asserted even where only one party has been
impacted by the mistake.
24. Id.
25. Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887) (granting the seller relief on a
mutual mistake defense theory).
26. Wood v. Boynton, 25 N.W. 42 (Wisc. 1885) (denying the seller relief sought on a
mutual mistake defense theory).
27 Sherwood, supra n. 25.
28 Wood, supra n. 26.
16

impracticable, nor were their primary purposes substantially frustrated.29
Comment c. specifically states that events that result in hardship to the party
seeking relief but that do not confer an advantage upon the other party are
“ordinarily appropriately left to the rules on impracticability and frustration.”30
The Comment then presents an Illustration that conveys the principle that that if
supervening knowledge of a fact substantially frustrates the purpose of one party,
but does not impact the other party, then “the effect on the agreed exchange of
performances is not material” and the adversely impacted party should instead seek
relief under the Section 266(2) supervening frustration provision.31
This position presented in Comment c. and elaborated upon by this
Illustration is an interesting idea as to the proper relationship of the mutual mistake
and excuse defense approaches, giving each approach a distinct and well-defined
scope of application, with there being relatively little overlap.32 The
29 But see ALCOA, supra n. 5, holding that an event that will turn an expected profit into
a substantial loss may justify a frustration of purpose defense.
30. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 152, Comment c. The Comment
unfortunately fails to elaborate as to what exceptional circumstances might justify departing from
this “ordinarily appropriate” principle.
31. Id. at Illustration 9. In my opinion the point made by this Illustration would be more
clear if Comment had taken the position that a mutual mistake that significantly impacts only one
party to a contract does not qualify as a “material effect on the agreed exchange,” despite perhaps
having a “material” impact, because a mistake with an effect on only one party even if “material”
should not be regarded as having an impact “on the exchange.” But the comment instead limits
“materiality” itself only to those events having a significant impact upon both parties.
32 But see ALCOA, supra n. 5, where the court held that the mutual mistake defense and
17

persuasiveness of this Illustration as a positive statement of the law, however, is
undercut by the fact that the Reporter’s Note to Section 152 states that this
particular Illustration was “suggested by Anderson Bros. v. O’Meara.”33 The
Reporter appears, however, to have unfortunately misread the holding of this case,
which denied relief for mutual mistake on the basis that the mistake was unilateral
rather than mutual, if there had been a mistake made at all,34 and not because the
impact of a mutual mistake was only upon the party seeking relief. The Anderson
Bros. case does not hold or even “suggest” that to be regarded as a mutual mistake
justifying relief the revelation of the unknown facts must impact both parties to the
contract, and it is somewhat concerning that the Reporter’s Note does not refer to
any more on-point case precedents that would support this proposition.35
The extent to which courts embrace this restrictive definition of materiality
in the mutual mistake context that is suggested by Comment c. is uncertain. The

the impracticability excuse defense and the frustration of purpose excuse defense all applied
under those circumstances, id. at 70.
33. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 152, Reporter’s Note to Comment c. See
Anderson Bros. v. O’Meara, 306 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1962).
34 Anderson Bros., id., at ___.
35 The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals has specifically rejected this interpretation of
Comment c. as requiring for a mutual mistake defense a showing that both parties to the contract
are impacted by the mistake:
“Rather, comment (c) [to Section 152] prescribes a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach, in which either or both parties may be adversely affected by a mutual mistake.”
Roers v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 728 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 2013).
18

noted contract law scholar Allan Farnsworth was ambivalent on this point in his
well-known single-volume contract law treatise. He first stated broadly that a party
seeking to assert a mutual mistake defense has a “better chance” of establishing
materiality if “the mistake also has an impact on the other party.” 36 However, the
only case that Farnsworth cited in support of this claim expresses agreement only
in dicta in a ruling that denied the mutual mistake defense on assumption of risk
grounds.37 Farnsworth also in his discussion cited a contrasting case that in his
opinion “supports the [opposing] view that hardship for one party is a sufficient
basis for avoidance for mistake,”38 and called attention to the position taken in

36 “The party adversely affected [by a mutual mistake] has a better chance of showing
that the effect on the agreed exchange is material if…the mistake also has an impact on the other
party. Courts have been reluctant to allow avoidance if the mistake merely makes the exchange
less desirable for one party…cases of [unilateral] hardship are ordinarily left to be dealt with
under the rules of impracticability and frustration” E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts, at 607-608
(4th ed. 2004). See also John Edward Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts (5th ed. 2011) at 494 (“If
the discovered mistake reveals an exchange that is not only substantially less desirable for one
party, but substantially more desirable for the other, a court will be more amenable to granting
relief than if there is merely a loss to one party without a corresponding gain to the other.”)
37 “A related distinction [to the mutual mistake versus assumption of risk grounds on
which the case before the court was decided] is the manner in which the mistake…affects the
contemplated performance or the equivalence of value. To the extent that Alcoa [in the ALCOA
case, supra n. 5] was disadvantaged by the mistake, Essex [the other party to the contract] was
enriched. Here, by contrast, while the unavailability of reprocessing has the effect of making
performance by Westinghouse more expensive, it in no way enriches Florida [the other party to
the contract], or gives Florida any benefit it did not bargain for.” In re Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 517 F.Supp. 440, 458 (E.D. Va. 1981) (cited by Farnsworth, id., at 608).
38 Farnsworth, supra n. 34, at 607 (“Case law supports this view that hardship for one
party is a sufficient basis for avoidance for mistake.”) (citing in support Dover Pool & Racquet
Club v. Brooking, 322 NE 2d 168, 171 (Mass. 1975) (“[A]s a result of the mistake enforcement
of the contract would be materially more onerous to the purchaser than it would have been had
19

Comment c. that even where a mutual mistake has had no impact on the other party
to the contract a person may be able to obtain mutual mistake relief under
“exceptional circumstances,”39 which are left undefined. He also noted more
generally that the mutual mistake cases “are not marked by their consistency in
either reasoning or result.”40
Even under this narrow interpretation of the “material effect on the agreed
exchange” phrasing of Section 152(1) as requiring that a mutual mistake must have
an impact upon both parties to provide a basis for relief there will still be some
overlap between these two approaches. There are instances for which the events at
issue, when they come to light, will not only have a material impact upon both
parties but will also potentially meet the requirements of one or more excuse
defenses,41 presenting the party seeking relief with a choice of approaches to
pursue. As discussed above, a comparison of the texts of Section 152(1) and
266(1) and (2) would appear to favor assertion of the mutual mistake defense as
easier to establish in all circumstances where both that defense and an excuse
the facts been as the parties believed them to be. The contract was therefore voidable by the
purchaser…”)
39 Id. at 607 (Citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 152, Comment c.).
40 Id. at 605.
41 “In many of the cases that come under this Section [266], relief under the rules
relating to mistake…will also be appropriate…In that event the party entitled to relief may, of
course, choose the ground on which he will rely.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section
266, Comment a. See also, e.g., ALCOA, supra n. 5, at 70-72.
20

defense are potentially available.
However, Comment c. to Section 152 not only suggests that an event must
impact both parties to the contract to be material but also suggests that even where
both parties are impacted the materiality threshold for the mutual mistake defense
should be set at a very high level. To the extent that the courts take this suggestion
it will be relevant for the choice of approaches because it will adversely impact the
prospects for success with the mutual mistake approach. Specifically, Comment c.
states that for a person seeking relief to show this material effect:
“It is not enough for him to prove that he would not have made the contract
had it not been for the mistake. He must show that the resulting imbalance
in the exchange is so severe that he can not be fairly required to carry it
out.”42
This quote from the Comment equates “material effect” with a “severe
imbalance” sufficient to make the exchange unfair, an extremely high materiality
threshold when contrasted with the commonly applied and much less demanding
standards of materiality in other contexts that I have noted above. If this stringent
“severe imbalance” materiality standard were to be widely embraced by the courts
for resolving mutual mistake claims this would greatly reduce or perhaps even
42. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 152, Comment c.
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eliminate altogether the gap between the “material effect” showing required for the
mutual mistake defense and the very substantial impacts that are required for the
impracticability, impossibility or frustration of purpose excuse defenses. However,
other portions of Comment c. undercut this call for consistent application of such a
stringent materiality standard rather than applying the much less demanding
materiality standards generally applied in commercial law or in securities law, or
the broader but still less restrictive multi-factor standard for determining
materiality in the implied-in-law contractual conditions context that is set forth in
Section 241.43
Despite the ambivalent position taken by Comment c. on the appropriate
materiality threshold a substantial number of courts have cited approvingly this
“severe imbalance” language in ruling upon mutual mistake defense claims, 44 as

43. That Comment later significantly undercuts its recommendation for use of this
stringent standard by broadly stating that “The standard of materiality here, as elsewhere in the
Restatement (e.g. Section 237) is a flexible one to be applied in light of all the circumstances.”
Id. Comment a. to Section 237 then refers the reader back to the broad, multi-factor
determination of materiality set forth in Section 241. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section
237, Comment a.
44 See., e.g., United States v. Thompson, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32820, at 15 (W.D. Pa.
2017); Schildkamp v. Feed Commodities International, LLC, 2016 Vt. Unpub. LEXIS 238 at 11
(Vt. 2016); Stegen v. Hanson, 2013 Iowa App. LEXIS 776 at 8-9 (Iowa App. 2013); Breeze v.
United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9598 at 16 (E.D. Tenn. 2013); Roers v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 728 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 2013); Roers v. Bank of America, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 116725 at 39 (D. C. Minn. 2012); Eteson v. Eteson, 2011 NJ Super Unpub. LEXIS
2547 at 13-14 ((NJ App. 2011); Miami Valley Paper v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GBMH,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150333 at 4 (S.D. Ohio 2010); United States v. Frownfelter, 626 F.3d
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have some commentators,45 with some of these courts finding the claims before
them to have met this stringent materiality standard,46 while a somewhat larger
number of other courts have applied this standard but found it to not have been
met,47 and still other courts have embraced this standard in dicta but have then
resolved the mutual mistake claim presented to them on other grounds.48

D. Discussion of Comment c. to Section 152.
The portion of Comment c. to Section 152 that suggests that the scope of the
mutual mistake defense should be restricted to circumstances where the events at
issue have affected the benefits and burdens of the contract to both parties, and to
549, 556 (10th Cir. 2010); City of Cape May v. Dash, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1624 at
35 (NJ Super. 2008); Land Grantors v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 580, 605 (Ct. Cl. 2008);
McKeever v. Warden, SCI-Grateford, 486 F.3d 81, 86 (3rd Cir. 2007); Leading Edge
Development Servs. v. EnXco Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92654 at 31 (Ct. Cl. 2005); Land
Grantors v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 614, 627 ((Ct. Cl. 2006); Land Grantors in Henderson,
Union v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 661, 706 (Ct. Cl. 2005); Wrisley v. Eleanor A. Krock &
Kathleen S. Keller, 2000 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 438 at 9 (Pa. Comm. Pleas 2000);
Hillside Ass’n of Hollis v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 135 N.H. 325, 332-333 (N.H. 1992);
Pawtucket Lodge No. 4 v. City of Pawtucket, 1985 R.I. Super. LEXIS 160 at 7-8 (R.I. 1985);
ALCOA, supra n. 5, at 64.
45 See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra n. 36, at 606 (citing approvingly the Comment c. “severe
imbalance” materiality criterion suggestion); Murray, supra n. 36, at 494 (citing a case that
quoted the “severe imbalance” language of Comment c.)
46 See., e.g., Land Grantors v. United States (2008), supra n. 44, Land Grantors in
Henderson, supra n. 44, Hillside Ass’n, id., Pawtucket Lodge, supra n. 44, ALCOA, supra n. 5.
47 See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, supra n. 44, Schildkamp, supra n.44, Stegen,
supra n. 44, Roers v. Bank of America, supra n. 44, Eteson, supra n. 44, United States v.
Frownfelter, supra n. 44, City of Cape May, supra n. 44, McKeever, supra n. 44.
48 See., e.g., Roers v. Contrywide, supra n. 44, Breeze, supra n. 44, Land Grantors v.
United States (2006), supra n. 44, Wrisley, supra n. 44.
23

thereby relegate to the excuse defenses any claims for relief based upon
supervening knowledge under circumstances where only one party’s performance,
or ability to have the contract meet their purposes, has been significantly impacted
by those events, makes some sense as a categorization framework. This
framework would clarify the scope of each approach, and would greatly limit their
areas of overlap. But it would also raise some new concerns that are not addressed
in the Comment.
Under that suggested framework most (but not all49) attempts to obtain
judicial relief based upon supervening knowledge of existing events would fit only
one approach or the other, depending on the circumstances, but not both. This
would have the advantage of often sparing the person seeking relief from the
burden of having to argue and prove each of two alternative theories, and would
consequently also reduce the burden on the courts. On the other hand, judicial
acceptance of this framework would very sharply curtail the availability of the
mutual mistake defense. The courts would then in most instances deny mutual
mistake relief to those persons who can establish that an event unknown at the time
of contracting has materially and adversely impacted them, but cannot demonstrate
that it has also adversely impacted the other party. Unless those persons can also
49 See, e.g., ALCOA, supra n. 5.
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show that the event has had sufficient impact upon them to render their
performance impossible or impracticable, or to partially frustrate their primary
purpose, very demanding requirements indeed, they will be denied relief
altogether.50
Comment c. to Restatement (Second) Section 152 also raises the question of
how significant the impact of a mutual mistake must be on a person before that
person can obtain relief from their contractual obligations on that basis. However,
even if the Section 152(1) requirement for the mutual mistake defense that the
mistake have a “material effect on the exchange” is interpreted (as the Comment
somewhat ambivalently recommends) as imposing a “severe imbalance” standard,
rather than either the much less stringent materiality criteria usually applied under
commercial law or securities law, or the also less stringent Section 241 multi-factor
criteria for finding materiality in the implied-in-law conditions context, that harsher
materiality standard still appears to be less demanding than the onerous eligibility
criteria that must be met to successfully invoke either the impossibility,

50 Whether the scope of mutual mistake relief should be so limited is a larger question
that is not addressed by Comment c., and that I will also not address in this brief essay. I am here
focusing solely on the scope of application and relative attractiveness of the mutual mistake and
excuse defense approaches for seeking relief under supervening knowledge circumstances, given
the eligibility contours that courts are in fact likely to apply for each of these approaches, and not
on the more theoretical and more difficult question of the proper eligibility criteria that should be
applied for each approach.
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impracticability or frustration of purpose excuse defenses. Imposition of a “severe
imbalance” materiality criterion would therefore appear to still leave the mutual
mistake approach at least modestly more attractive than the excuse defense
approach under those circumstances in which a person might arguably qualify for
relief under either approach.

CONCLUSION
When a person seeks judicial relief from their contractual obligations on the
basis that the parties to the contract were not aware of facts existing at the time of
contracting, through no fault of their own, and those facts when later revealed have
made that person’s performance arguably either impracticable or impossible, or
have arguably partially frustrated their primary purpose in entering into the
contract, the text of Restatement (Second) Sections 152(1) and 266(1) and (2)
viewed in isolation suggests that both the mutual mistake defense and one or
another of the excuse defenses will each be available as plausible argumentative
approaches, and that the mutual mistake defense will generally be easier to
establish because the materiality of the mistake will usually be less difficult to
establish than would be the more demanding criteria of each of the excuse
defenses.
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Comment c. to Section 152, however, goes well beyond the Section’s text in
suggesting two limitations on the scope of the mutual mistake defense that would
make the choice of approach to pursue for relief more complicated. That Comment
first suggests that the mutual mistake defense should be limited in its application to
only those circumstances where the facts that later come to light impact the
benefits and burdens of the contract to both parties, and in general should not be
allowed under those circumstances where the facts when revealed have a material
impact on one party possibly substantial enough to render that party’s performance
impossible or impracticable, or partially frustrate that party’s primary purpose in
entering into the contract, but that do not affect the value of the contract to the
other party. That Comment essentially calls for a requirement that a mutual
mistake have a material effect on both parties, i.e. a material effect “on the
exchange,” rather than simply a material impact on the person seeking relief.
If this limit on the scope of the mutual mistake defense was judicially
embraced it would clarify in most instances which of these two approaches were a
more suitable basis for relief, given the circumstances, although in some instances
both approaches for seeking relief would still be available.51 But adoption of this
limiting principle would do more than simply provide clarification as to which
51 See., e.g., ALCOA, supra n. 5.
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approach was more appropriate. It would also severely restrict the availability of
the mutual mistake defense under circumstances where the facts when revealed
materially impact only one party to the contract, and where the impact is not
sufficient for that person to be able to meet the stringent excuse defense criteria.
Absent a judicial consensus that the scope of the mutual mistake defense should be
so sharply curtailed it would probably be preferable to develop some other criterion
for determining when a contracting party who seeks relief based on supervening
knowledge of existing facts should pursue a mutual mistake approach, and when
they should instead seek to invoke an excuse defense.
Whether or not the mutual mistake defense is interpreted to require that both
parties be impacted by the mistake, in those supervening knowledge instances
where either the mutual mistake or the excuse defense approach arguably meets the
requisite criteria then the question remains as to which approach would be more
promising to the party seeking relief. The text of the relevant Restatement
(Second) Sections 152(1) and 266(1) and (2) as discussed above suggest that the
mutual mistake approach will dominate the excuse defense approach under all
circumstances of supervening knowledge.52 However, one portion of Comment c.
to Section 152 somewhat ambivalently suggests a second limitation on the mutual
52 See Farnsworth et al (1981), supra n. 6.
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mistake defense, a limitation that the “material effect” criterion should require a
showing of a “severe imbalance” of a magnitude sufficient to make it unfair to hold
the adversely impacted person to their contractual obligation. This strict criterion,
which as I have noted has been embraced by a significant number of courts,53
would sharply limit the advantage of pressing the mutual mistake approach for
relief over attempting to satisfy any of the excuse defenses with their strict
requirements. But it would not entirely eliminate that advantage given how
difficult those excuse defense criteria are to meet.
In overall conclusion, the mutual mistake defense should probably be
advanced at least as an alternative ground for relief in any instance where one is
seeking to be excused from one’s contractual obligations on the basis of
impossibility, impracticability or frustration of purpose as a result of supervening
knowledge. There does not appear to be any significant downside risk of doing
so.54 The mutual mistake approach certainly will have a substantial advantage over
the excuse defense approach if the reviewing court does not require a showing of
impact upon both parties to the contract to meet the “material effect on the
53 See supra n. 44.
54 As a matter of argumentative strategy, however, pleading a very weak argument, even
only as an alternative ground for recovery, may possibly distract a court from focusing on and
recognizing the merits of the stronger arguments that one is presenting. A decision should be
made as to whether such secondary arguments that can be pleaded in the alternative are plausible
enough to avoid tainting by association the primary theories being advanced.
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exchange” requirement of this approach. And even if a restrictive “severe
imbalance” materiality requirement is imposed by the court, as will often be the
case,55 this will still probably be an easier showing to make than satisfying the very
demanding requirements of either the impossibility, impracticability, or frustration
of purposes defenses.56

55 See supra n. 46.
56 See supra n. 20.
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